Introduction
Today, at the beginning of the third millennium, the problem of rationality is extremely acute, and not only philosophical reflection brings it to the level of key problems of European culture. One can state with certainty that a sudden turn to the issue of the relationship between rationality and faith is not a consequence of the search for new theoretical horizons of the problem, but this is a question posed by life itself, and therefore the relevance of the problem is of a practical nature. What was the reason for the explosion of interest in rationality? According to the philosopher P. Gaidenko, "the urgency of the problem of rationality is caused by the growing concern about the fate of modern civilization as a whole, not to mention the further prospects of science and technology development. The crises caused by the technotronic civilization, and above all the ecological one, are what ultimately is behind such a widespread interest in the problem of rationality" (Gaidenko, 2003: 9) .
In the history of Western European philosophy, "rationality" is inevitably connected with "common sense" and "rationalism" -not just concepts expressing the doctrinal pathos of the new European era, but the phenomena that cement the cultural and historical core of the entire European paradigm. They can be rightly considered the ones to determine the logic of European culture from antiquity to our days. And therefore one of the main tasks, within the framework of our research, will be not just the conscious avoidance of equating these concepts, but, moreover, their distinction, while their correlation has deep roots in the historical and cultural field. What is the need to determine the place of the "watershed" in this issue? Academician S. Averintsev justifies the importance of distinguishing the concepts "rationalism" and "rationality" as follows: "I would like to distinguish this concept as sharply as possible (rationalism -author's italics, Yu.S.)
within my materials from other concepts, primarily from the concept rationality as the feature of homo sapiens, from rationality and intelligence inherent in the Homer's Odyssey, because it seems to me extremely important that the transition from rationality to rationalism, i.e. from unformalized rationality to formalized, from rationality as the feature of homo sapiens to the formation of the technique of selfexamination of thought, when there are such things as epistemological problems, rules of logic, etc. -that this transition is in no way smooth and cannot be described as evolution" (Averintsev, 1989: 332-342) .
Faith is a concept even less definite than "rationality" despite more evident lexical difference. The problem of the term is seen in its extreme "blurriness", which is present both phases of its existence at the same time -religious and everyday. Therefore, for example, scientists are considered to deny faith (it is not about their personal religiousness) in their professional activities in any form; but a religious person who somehow relates his/her life to otherness, is given a public credit of doubt in epistemological "security" and common sense. Unfortunately, such a stable culturological opposition deprives the possibility of reasonable analysis, and yet psychological studies of this issue remove the cliched covers from it explaining that faith is "a special phenomenon, since it is neither a process, nor a phenomenon, nor a state. Faith is not limited to religious faith, but acts as the basis of rational thinking of a person (and in this it comes close to knowledge)" (Maikova, 2010: 315-319) .
Statement of the Problem
Now let us pay attention to the etymological secondary character of the concept "rationality", since the Latin word ratio is nothing but a free loan word from the Greek word logos introduced by Cicero. This circumstance makes the interpretation of the logos inevitable and important for understanding the original ways of rationality interwoven with the subsequent numerous historical and cultural inclusions.
Continuing the etymological digression, it is worth pointing to the circumstance that the logos as a conceptual unit is not reducible to a single semantic "anchor"; in the authoritative Greek dictionary of I. Dvoretskii, the word λόγος has 34 meaning groups, and this group, to some extent, is seen as a necessary addition to the value of the first one.
But what is the logos in the cosmic order of ancient Greek existence? As the Russian philosopher S.N. Trubetskoi, in his fundamental work devoted to logos (The Teaching on the Logos in Its History, 1906), the term occurs several times already in Homer's works, but in contrast to "mythos", "logos" in the Homeric epic is used in depreciatory meaning, such as: something dubious, evil, which one should not trust. However, Trubetskoi continues, "little by little this attitude changes radically: the "logos" takes precedence over "myth" or "epic". The myth from a "story" turns into a "legend" or a "fairy tale" and is opposed to the true wordlogos; "epic" in turn becomes a talk, a rumor, a saying, i.e. those words in which speech is put, sometimes for its decoration, sometimes in order to hide its true meaning" (Trubetskoi, 2000: 20) .
It is worth pointing out a non-random conjugation of the mythos and the logos (the very name "mythology" underlines the dialectical nature of the phenomenon) in ancient culture.
Explaining the meaning of the title of this section, let us refer to the symbolic conception of the myth by A. Losev, which asserts that the myth is ontologically rooted both in man and in the public consciousness. Thus, the myth according to Losev is the same eidos (logically constructed): the eidos is an ontological essential force; the logos is a methodological and instrumental design of the eidos. Hierarchically it is built as follows: logos of eidos, logos of logos, logos of meon, logos of sophia, logos of energy. Identification and, at the same time, distinction of the eidos and the logos by Losev is explained quite clearly: "The eidos and the logos are a kingdom of non-flowing and self-identical meaning" (Losev, 1999: 187) ; "The logos, or logical construction, the eidos gave us dialectics" (Losev, 1999: 187) ; "The logos of the expression of the eidos is the subject of aesthetics, and the logos of the expression of the logos is the subject of grammar" (Losev, 1999: 183) . As there is no doubt that poetry and prose are literature that differ in expressive means, so the eidos and the logos, according to Losev's thought, should be considered the same way (by the way, the philosopher illustrates his arguments on examples of philology). That is why there is no contradiction in the words of S. Trubetskoi: "... in the period of intellectual maturity, the myth departs entirely to the field of tradition, poetry or fiction. The myth, which was once true, turns into a "false talk imitating the truth" or already into a poetic plot, a fable (e.g. "myths" of Aesop).
The former usage remains partly in the works of tragedians, in poetry. The logographer is primarily a prose writer in contrast to a poet -"aeda": the first Greek "logographers" are the most ancient historians from Cadmus and Hecataeus of Miletus to Herodotus, who wrote the history in prose in contrast to the poetic form of the myth used by epic poets. The mythological world outlook of poetry was replaced by the sensible prose" (Trubetskoi, 2000: 21) .
The ambiguity of interpreting the word (Heidegger, 2011: 30) . However, further Heidegger gives a detailed explanation:
"Nevertheless, we need to remember well that λόγος is not a "word", not a "speech" and not a "language". This is clear from the fact that the main meaning of this Greek word can in no way imply anything like "speech" and "language", and does not contain any hint of anything linguistic and similar to language. Though on the other hand, it is indisputable that λόγος and the associated verb λέγειν are quite early used by the Greeks in the sense of "talking", "saying". These are two indisputable facts that should be accepted. There is something mysterious in their neighbourship with each other" (Heidegger, 2011: 294) . Defining Heraclitus' Logos by means of the triad: "One and All", "gathering and accumulation", "the name of being", Heidegger clarifies the key thing:
"Logos is something audible, something like speech and voice, but apparently not the voice of a person voicing, announcing his speech" (Heidegger, 2011: 300) . Let us complement this thought with another important place in which the German thinker discovers the "second bottom" of the usual concept, relating the logos to the eidos (in essence, we again meet the thought that was previously discovered in A. Losev's work):
"Thus, in some way είδος and λόγος are one and the same. In other words, λόγος understood as naming and saying, is comprehended in correlation with ιδέα; Λόγος, taken as a saying, is that understanding of the "logos" that moves in the circle of thinking, thinking of what exists from ideas, that is, metaphysically, λόγος conceivable by logic, is λόγος, which is thought metaphysically. Logic is the metaphysics of the "logos" (Heidegger, 2011: 312) .
Another interpretation of the "logos" was suggested by the representatives of the Eleatic school. Parmenides and his disciples believed that phenomena cannot be identified with the absolutely existing (logos). The eleates first contrasted the abstract thought (the logos as "a word about the existing") to the reality (visibility, dox). S. Trubetskoi writes: "He (the philosopher) comes to it (logos) from consideration of the external nature, and not from the analysis of logical processes. Thus, in the earliest period of Greek philosophy, the term logos has a vacillating meaning. It means mainly the reasoning in both the objective and the subjective sense. The nature of things is understood in reasoning, which is opposed to deceptive appearances; abstract thought embraces in itself the truth, from which the conclusion could subsequently come that this thought coincides with the truth or that truth is an idea. On the other hand, reasoning is the action of the human mind expressed in the speech or abilities of the human spirit -judiciousness" (Trubetskoi, 2000: 24) . The continuation of this idea we find in the judgment of the domestic philosopher S. Neretina emphasizing that "ancient philosophy investigated the essence of things in themselves, independent of each other.
The word was one of those things that had a strictly defined function. It also meant "a word spoken aloud", so it was especially important to find out the elusive speech connections, their logic (from the Greek logos -word, thought).
This feature of ancient literature defined in many ways the open nature of education: through conversations and dialogues that took place somewhere in the bosom of nature, the feast-symposium" (Neretina, 1995: 15) .
These are the first historical definitions of the logos -the rational beginning. As we see, already at the dawn of Greek philosophy there is no unambiguous understanding of the "logos":
-mythological intuition identifies the logos with the truth, but this identification is functional, since the logos is an intermediary: a reasonable carrier, but also a "crafty slave" of the truth; -in the interpretations of the first philosophers, the logos is identified with either the inner law of being -the logos is the truth (the Heraclitus' line), or opposed to the phenomenon (the Parmenides' line). But in both cases, the preSocratic logos is the sounded being, the "essence of the ratio, the mind", the expression of the mind that fills the entire space of the cosmos: that is what we now call antique cosmo-logism -the rational binding uniting the physical and mental organics of the Ancient Hellas; -early ancient philosophy does not know the rigid dichotomy of the logos and the eidos (mythos); it rather contains the intention of detecting the topos of the difference between them.
Discussion
Starting to review the situation of the Middle Ages, it is necessary to take into account a number of circumstances that should help us in an impartial analysis. of and the rich have gained" (Rozanov, 1906: 109).
It is evidently obvious: popular since the Enlightenment, speculation on the "intolerant" confrontation, looks, in this light, not quite thorough, and the dilemma known to us today, another name of which is the confrontational idiom "science and religion", was generated precisely by the development of the doctrine that ended with "isolation" of this doctrine
by rational systems of theology that occurred at the end of the Middle Ages (Renaissance) (therefore it is no coincidence that in its "birth with its empiricism, rationalism, sensationalism and subjectivism" (Evdokimtsev, 2008: 35-38 ). and unlike the theories of the modern science, it is sufficiently stable and sensual enough to really be an image -an exciting topic for the imagination" (Averintsev, 1989: 3-13) .
Conclusion
Thus, if we interpret the logos as a metaphysically-integral law taken as a necessary The era of one and a half thousand years of "cruising" around the logos ended with an "exit" beyond the known, though undiscovered, orbit.
No wonder the German historian of philosophy
Wilhelm Windelband thought that "the Middle
Ages took the path that has been made by the Greeks in their internal relation to science, in the opposite direction" (Windelband, 1997: 222) . This is partly why the pathos of Renaissance formally clothed in human garments, remained unrealized due to the inability to "self-revival", creating the "exhibits" alien to the intuition of the logos: "at first timidly and tentatively, then more and more assertive, again awakens the desire for the knowledge itself; it originally appears in those areas which are more remote from all the inviolable principles of faith, but in the end it breaks out uncontrollably in all spheres; science begins to separate from faith, philosophy from theology" (Windelband, 1997: 222) . into a type of civilization); therefore, the first three centuries of the new era can be fully considered as a unique cultural "gap" between the end of the era of the logos and the beginning of the era of the ratio; − the dilemma, another name of which is the confrontational idiom "science and religion", was generated precisely by the development of the doctrine that ended with "isolation" of this doctrine by rational systems of theology that occurred at the end of the Middle Ages (Renaissance).
